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To keep global warming below 1.5°C, unabated coal power should significantly decline by 20301,2 
and in most scenarios cease by 20501,3. The members of the Powering Past Coal Alliance (PPCA), 
launched in 2017 at the UNFCCC Conference of the Parties, commit to “phasing out existing 
unabated coal power generation and a moratorium on new coal power generation without 
operational carbon capture and storage”4. The Alliance has been hailed as a “political 
watershed”5 and a new “anti-fossil fuel norm”6. Here we estimate that the premature retirement 
of power plants pledged by PPCA members would cut 1.6 GtCO2, which is 150 times smaller than 
globally committed emissions from existing coal power plants. We also investigate the prospect 
of major coal consumers joining the Alliance by systematically comparing PPCA members to 
non-members. PPCA members extract and use less coal and have older power plants, but this 
alone does not fully explain their pledges to phase-out coal power. In addition, the members of 
the Alliance are wealthier and have more transparent and independent governments. Thus, what 
sets them aside from major coal consumers such as China and India are both the smaller costs of 
coal phase-out and the higher capacity to bear these costs. 
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The PPCA includes 30 national and 22 subnational jurisdictions and covers 4.4% of the global coal 
capacity. Twenty-four PPCA members do not operate coal power plants nor have they built new power 
plants since the early 2000s. Two other PPCA members, Belgium and Scotland phased-out coal power 
already in 2016. We find that most PPCA members pledge to retire coal plants when their average age 
approaches the average coal plants lifetimes and that these pledges are in line with recent trends (Table 1, 
Supplementary Figure 1). Moreover, the number of newly constructed coal power plants in PPCA 
countries have declined since 1990 (Supplementary Figure 2) and several PPCA members planned to 
phase-out coal power already before the launch of the Alliance7–11. The Netherlands is a clear outlier to 
this trend with a pledge to retire three coal plants commissioned in 201512.  
How many coal power plants would be retired prematurely as a result of PPCA pledges depends on the 
assumed plant lifetimes. Since the lifetimes have been recently rising (Supplementary Figure 3), for our 
reference estimate we use national average lifetimes since 2000 (Table 1). Given these lifetimes, the PPCA 
pledges would lead to premature retirement of 46% of coal power plants in PPCA members or 2% of the 
global coal power capacity. 
Emissions avoided as a result of premature retirement depend on assumed plant lifetimes, emission 
factors, efficiencies and load factors, as well as on what substitutes coal power. Under our reference 
estimate, which assumes national average lifetimes and load factors, technology-specific efficiencies 
(Methods) and zero-emission substitution, PPCA pledges result in 1.6 GtCO2 avoided emissions between 
2019 and 2050. Over 70% of the avoided emissions are in four countries: Italy, the Netherlands, Israel 
and Canada (Supplementary Table 1). Italy, the Netherlands, Israel and Hawaii are the only four 
jurisdictions where the cumulative avoided emissions are larger than their current annual CO2 emissions. 
Beyond 2050, the PPCA pledges would result in an additional 0.1 GtCO2 of avoided emissions 
concentrated in South Chungcheong, South Korea.  
The two largest uncertainties of this estimate are plant lifetimes and coal power substitutes. Under the 
standard plant lifetime range (30-50 years13,14), the avoided emissions would be 0.5-2.5 GtCO2 and under 
the widest reported lifetime range (20-60 years15) – 0.1-4.5 GtCO2 (Supplementary Text 1, Supplementary 
Figure 4, Supplementary Table 3). Varying the plant efficiencies and load factors by 10% leads to a 
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variation from the reference estimate by +/- 0.3 GtCO2. Finally, if coal power is substituted not by low-
emission technologies or demand reduction but instead by natural gas, the avoided emissions would drop 
in half.  
These estimates can be compared to the globally committed emissions from currently operating coal 
power plants, which are estimated at 206 GtCO2 under a 40-year lifetime, 296 GtCO2 under a 50-year 
lifetime15 and therefore at ca 242 GtCO2  under 44-year lifetime (the lifetime in our reference estimate). 
This is approximately 150 times larger than the reference effect of the PPCA pledges (see Supplementary 
Table 3 for other lifetime assumptions). The PPCA pledges would reduce annual coal-fired generation by 
94 TWh by 2030 (17-230 TWh given lifetime uncertainty) compared to the scenario with no premature 
retirement. This can be contrasted to the expected reductions in annual coal power generation in 2°C 
scenarios, which is around 10,000 TWh worldwide (2,800 TWh in OECD), and in 1.5°C scenarios – 
12,000 TWh worldwide (3,400 TWh in OECD) (Figure 1 – reductions are calculated as differences 




Table 1. Pledged phase-out dates, number, capacity and age of coal power in PPCA countries. 
The pledged phase-out dates are compiled from national sources referenced in Column 2. (Reports of 
Belgium’s 2016 phase-out18 conflicts with the IEA that still reports a small amount of coal use in 
electricity in 201719). All power plant age and lifetime data are calculated based on Platts20. Average 
fleet ages are weighted by generation capacity and calculated as of 2019. The theoretical average 
and minimum ages at phase-out are calculated by adding the 2019 ages to the number of years 
between 2019 and the phase-out date. The average lifetime is calculated as the mean of plants 
retiring since 2000 (“-“ marks countries with less than four retired plants – see Methods). See 
Supplementary Table 1 for sub-national jurisdictions. 
Country (or state) Pledge Number & (GWe) 




& (minimum) age 









Belgium phased-out (2016)18 - - - - 
France phase-out 202118 51 (3.2) 37 (27) 39 (29) 40 (18) 
Austria phase-out 202218,21 9 (0.8) 36 (20) 39 (23) 32 (29) 
Sweden phase-out 202218,21 3 (0.1) 35 (29) 38 (32) - 
Italy phase-out 202518,21 34 (10.5) 32 (9) 38 (15) 48 (36) 
U.K. phase-out 202518,21 45 (15.3) 47 (28) 53 (34) 44 (34) 
Ireland phase-out 202518 3 (0.9) 33 (32) 39 (38) - 
Canada phase-out 203022 33 (9.1) 33 (5) 44 (16) 41 (33) 
Denmark phase-out 203018 9 (2.5) 33 (21) 44 (32) 40 (33) 
Finland phase-out 203018,21 20 (2.6) 39 (25) 50 (36) - 
Netherlands phase-out 203018,21 6 (4.8) 10 (3) 21 (14) 36 (28) 
New Zealand phase-out 203023 9 (0.5) 36 (25) 47 (36) - 
Portugal phase-out 203018 6 (1.9) 30 (24) 41 (35) - 
Israel phase-out 203024 10 (4.9) 28 (18) 39 (29) - 
Mexico no specific date25 18 (5.5) 25 (9) - - 
Angola, Costa Rica, El 
Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, 
Latvia, Liechtenstein, 
Lithuania, Luxembourg, 
Marshall Islands, Niue, 
Senegal, Switzerland, 
Tuvalu, Vanuatu 
No operating coal 
power plants 




Figure 1. Impact of the PPCA pledges. Panel (a) shows the historical and projected age structure of 
the coal fleet for PPCA members (both national and subnational). The solid bars show the historical 
age structure and the future projection based on historically observed lifetimes with no new 
construction (see Methods). The dashed line adds additional premature retirements in accordance 
with the PPCA pledges (Table 1 and Supplementary Table 1). See Supplementary Figure 5 for the 
projected age structure under alternative mean lifetimes. Panel (b) shows the impact of PPCA 
pledges on the global and OECD coal power generation in the business as usual (BAU) and climate 
stabilization scenarios from ref. 16,17 where the bar height is the median value and the error bar is 
the full range in the scenarios (see Methods). The OECD panel shows the reference, low and high 
estimates of the PPCA impact depending on the assumed plant lifetimes. 
 
To examine the prospects of additional countries joining the PPCA, we focus on the 69 countries 
(including 14 PPCA members) that currently produce at least 1% of their electricity supply from coal (see 
Methods). Of the greatest relevance to climate mitigation is the likelihood for the largest coal consumers, 
18 countries which together account for over 90% of coal-based power (Coal18 – Supplementary Tables 
4, 5), to join the PPCA. 
To systematically compare PPCA members with other countries, we examine national characteristics 
potentially affecting the likelihood of coal power phase-out (Supplementary Table 6, Supplementary Text 
2). Figure 2a illustrates that PPCA members have smaller shares of coal in electricity supply, particularly 
compared to Coal18 countries. Thus, it is easier for PPCA countries to substitute coal power with other 
technologies, especially given their lower electricity demand growth (Figure 2e). Additionally, PPCA 
countries produce less coal (Figure 2b) and rely more on coal imports (Figure 2c), which means that coal 
phase-out would have a smaller effect on mining employment, coal-dependent regions, and energy 
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Table 1 | Pledged phase-out dates, number, capacity and age of coal power in PPCA countries
Country (or state) Pledge Number  
(capacity in GWe) 














Belgium Phased-out (2016)49 – – – –
France Phase-out 202149 51 (3.2) 37 (27) 39 (29) 40 (18)
Austria Phase-out 202249,50 9 (0.8) 36 (20) 39 (23) 32 (29)
Sweden Phase-out 202249,50 3 (0.1) 35 (29) 38 (32) –
Italy Phase-out 202549,50 34 (10.5) 32 (9) 38 (15) 48 (36)
UK Phase-out 202549,50 45 (15.3) 47 (28) 53 (34) 44 (34)
Ireland Phase-out 202549 3 (0.9) 33 (32) 39 (38) –
Canada Phase-out 203051 33 (9.1) 33 (5) 44 (16) 41 (33)
Denmark Phase-out 203049 9 (2.5) 33 (21) 44 (32) 40 (33)
Finland Phase-out 203049,50 20 (2.6) 39 (25) 50 (36) –
Netherlands Phase-out 203049,50 6 (4.8) 10 (3) 21 (14) 36 (28)
New Zealand Phase-out 203052 9 (0.5) 36 (25) 47 (36) –
Portugal Phase-out 203049 6 (1.9) 30 (24) 41 (35) –
Israel Phase-out 203053 10 (4.9) 28 (18) 39 (29) –
Mexico No specific date54 18 (5.5) 25 (9) – –
Angola, Costa Rica, El Salvador, 
Ethiopia, Fiji, Latvia, Liechtenstein, 
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Marshall 
Islands, Niue, Senegal, Switzerland, 
Tuvalu, Vanuatu
No operating coal  
power plants
– – – –
The pledged phase-out dates are compiled from national sources referenced in column 2. Reports of Belgium’s 2016 phase-out49 conflict with the International Energy Agency, which still reports more than 
1% of electricity supply from coal in 201723 thus we include it in our logistic regression analysis. Sweden has less than 1% of electricity supply from coal so is not included in our logistic regression analysis. 
All power plant age and lifetime data are calculated on the basis of ref. 24. Average fleet ages are weighted by generation capacity and calculated as of 2019. The theoretical average and minimum ages at 
phase-out were calculated by adding the 2019 ages to the number of years between 2019 and the phase-out date. The average lifetime was calculated as the mean lifetime of plants retiring since 2000 
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Fig. 1 | Impact of the PPCA pledges. a, Historical and projected age structure of the coal fleet for PPCA members (both national and subnational).  
Solid bars show the historical age structure and the future projection based on historically observed lifetimes with no new construction (see Methods). 
The dashed line depicts premature retirements in accordance with the PPCA pledges (Table 1 and Supplementary Table 2). Supplementary Fig. 5 shows 
projected age structure under alternative mean lifetimes. b, Impact of PPCA pledges on the global and OECD coal power generation in the BAU and 
climate-stabilization scenarios fro  r fs. 16,17. Bar eight shows the me ian v lue and the error bar shows he full range in the scenarios (see Methods).  
The OECD panel shows the reference, low and high estimates of the reduction from PPCA pledges, depending on the assumed plant lifetimes.
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security, which could suffer if domestic coal is replaced by imported fuels or electricity26,27. Furthermore, 
fewer PPCA countries have young coal fleets (Figure 2d) associated with higher risks of stranded 
infrastructure assets13 and resistance from power plant owners26.  
In addition to facing lower barriers to coal phase-out, PPCA members have higher capacities to 
overcome these barriers, i.e. higher GDP per capita (Figure 2g) and functioning of government (FoG) 
index, which reflects the absence of undue influence on elected government, government transparency, 
and checks against political corruption28 (Figure 2h). These characteristics enable PPCA members to 
more effectively formulate and implement coal phase-out policies (Supplementary Text 2). Exposure to 
air pollution in PPCA countries is lower than in both Coal18 and the rest of the world (Figure 2e), thus air 
pollution is not likely a direct driver of PPCA membership (Supplementary Text 3). Due to the high 
correlation and interdependence between explanatory variables (Supplementary Figure 6), identifying key 
drivers of PPCA membership requires additional statistical analysis. 
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Figure 2. Difference between PPCA and Coal18 countries. Boxes represent interquartile ranges 
for the respective variables and country groups; thick lines within boxes represent medians; vertical 
lines and dots represent data points outside the interquartile ranges. Panel (a) shows share of coal in 
electricity supply. Panel (b) shows coal production per capita. Panel (c) shows import independence 
of coal supply. Panel (d) shows the average age of coal power plant units. Panel (e) shows the 
change in electricity demand (2006-2016). Panel (f) shows air pollution. Panel (g) shows GDP per 
capita. Panel (g) shows Functioning of government. See Methods for data sources and calculations. 
 
To evaluate which variables probabilistically explain a country’s membership in PPCA, we conduct a 
multivariate logistic regression analysis using PPCA membership as a binary dependent variable and 11 
independent variables including 8 shown in Figure 2 plus EU membership, share of non-hydro 
renewables and share of coal in non-transport final energy use (Methods, Supplementary Table 6, 
Supplementary Text 2). According to this analysis, FoG and GDP per capita have a significant positive 
effect on PPCA membership (Supplementary Tables 7, 8 and 9). The strength of the coal sector – 
measured by coal production per capita, coal share in electricity generation and in non-transport final 
energy use – have a significant negative effect on PPCA membership, especially when considered 
collectively. Air pollution has a paradoxical negative effect on PPCA membership and the effect of the 
remaining five variables is considerably less pronounced (Supplementary Table 10). The best-fit model 
with fewest explanatory variables includes the share of coal in electricity and FoG (Supplementary Tables 
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have relatively low shares of coal in the electricity supply, partic-
ularly compared with Coal18 countries. Therefore, it is easier for 
PPCA countries to substitute coal power with other technologies, 
especially given their lower electricity demand growth (Fig. 2e). 
Additionally, PPCA countries produce less coal (Fig. 2b) and rely 
more on coal imports (Fig. 2c), which means that coal phase-out 
would have a smaller effect on mining employment, coal-dependent 
regions and energy security, which could suffer if domestic coal is 
replaced by imported fuels or electricity18,19. Furthermore, few r 
PPCA countries have young coal fleets (Fig. 2d), which are associ-
ated with higher risks of stranded infrastructure assets13 and resis-
tance from power plant owners18.
In addition to facing lower barriers to coal phase-out, PPCA 
members have higher capacities to overcome these barriers, that 
is, higher gross domestic product (GDP) per capita (Fig. 2g) and 
higher functioning-of-government (FoG) index, which reflec s the 
absence of undue influence on elected government, government 
transparency and checks against political corruption20 (Fig. 2h). 
These characteristics enable PPCA members to more effectively 
formulate and implement coal phase-out policies (Supplementary 
Text 2). Exposure to air pollution in PPCA countries is lower than 
in Coal18 countries and the rest of the world (Fig. 2e). Air pollution 
is therefore not likely to be a direct driver of PPCA membership 
(Supplementary Text 3). Due to the high correlation and interde-
pendence between explanatory variables (Supplementary Fig. 6), 
identifying key drivers of PPCA membership requires additional 
statistical analysis.
To evaluate which variables probabilistically explain a country’s 
membership of the PPCA, we conducted a multivariate logistic 
regression analysis using PPCA membership as a binary dependent 
variable and 11 independent variables, including 8 shown in Fig. 2, 
EU membership, share of non-hydro renewables and share of coal 
in non-transport final energy use (Methods, Supplementary Table 
6 and Supplementary Text 2). According to this analysis, FoG and 
GDP per capita have a significant positive effect on PPCA member-
ship (Supplementary Tables 7–9). The strength of the coal sector—
measured by coal production per capita and coal share in electricity 
generation and in non-transport final energy use—have a signifi-
cant negative effect on PPCA membership, especially when con-
sidered collectively. Air pollution has a paradoxical negative effect 
on PPCA membership, and the effect of the remaining five vari-
ables is considerably less pronounced (Supplementary Table 10). 
The best-fit model with fewest explanatory variables includes the 
share of coal in electricity and FoG (Supplementary Tables 7–9 and 
Supplementary Text 3). The effect of these two variables on PPCA 
membership is shown in F g. 3.
According to this analysis, the five Coal18 countries with a 
greater than 5% probability of joining PPCA are Spain, Germany, 
Japan, the United States and Australia. Spain gets 13% of its electric-
ity supply from primarily imported coal and has an old coal power 
plant fleet. It recently announced an agreement to shut down all coal 
mines by the end of 201921 and its National Climate and Energy Plan 
states that coal plants will not supply electricity beyond 203022.
Germany—which has coal power capacity similar to that of all 
the PPCA members combined, a higher share of coal in its electric-
ity supply than any PPCA member (46%)23, a younger fleet (30 yr 
weighted-average age24) and produces about half of its coal domesti-
cally23—recently formulated a plan to phase out coal power by 2038 
or 203525 and has signalled interest in joining the PPCA26. Similarly 
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Fig. 2 | Difference between PPCA and Coal18 countries. a, Share of coal in the electricity supply. b, Coal production per capita (toe, tonne of oil 
equivalent). c, Import independence of coal supply. d, Average age of coal power plant units. e, Change in electricity demand (2006–2016). f, Air pollution. 
g, GDP per capita. h, FoG index. See Methods for data sources and calculations. Boxes represent int rquartile ranges for the respective variables and 
country groups; thick lines within boxes represent medians; vertical lines and dots represent data points outside the interquartile ranges.
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7, 8 and 9, Supplementary Text 3). The effect of these two variables on PPCA membership is illustrated 
in Figure 3.  
Figure 3. Functioning of Government index and share of coal in electricity generation in PPCA 
members, Coal18 and other countries. The size of the circles indicates the current coal power 
capacity. Coal18 countries are bolded and circled in black (Supplementary Tables 4 and 5). Countries 
with subnational units which have joined the PPCA are marked with an asterisk (Supplementary Table 
1). The dashed line and the shaded area illustrate the results of the logistic regression analysis. The 
area to the left and above the dashed line shows the predicted probability of belonging to the Alliance 
above 50% according to Model 1.4 (Supplementary Table 7). The shaded area shows where the 
probability of belonging to the Alliance is at least 5%. See Methods for definition and calculation of 
variables. 
 
According to this analysis, the five Coal18 countries with a greater than 5% probability of joining PPCA 
are Spain, Germany, Japan, the US, and Australia. Spain gets 13% of its electricity supply from primarily 
imported coal and has an old power plant fleet. It recently announced an agreement to shut down all coal 
mines by the end of 201929 and its National Climate and Energy plan states that coal plants will not 
supply electricity beyond 203030.  
Germany, which has coal power capacity similar to all PPCA members combined, a higher share of coal 
in electricity than any of the PPCA members (46%), a younger fleet (30 years weighted average age), and 
produces about one-half of its coal domestically19, has recently formulated a plan to phase-out coal power 
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coming decade: the units proposed to close in 2022 will be 46 yr old 
on average and those proposed to close in 2030 will be 41 yr old on 
average, compared with the recent average lifetime of coal power 
plants in Germany of 41 yr. However, the final stage of the phase-
out would break with this pattern by closing many of the recently 
constructed power plants. The average age of the remaining units, 
which comprise about a third of the current capacity, would be 
30 yr in 2038 (Supplementary Fig. 7 and Supplementary Text 4). An 
evaluation planned for 2032 may reverse this decision or acceler-
ate it to 2035. The German coal exit would avoid 0.6–1.6 GtCO2 
emissions between 2019 and 2050, depending on the final phase-
out date and how much coal will be substituted by natural gas. The 
plan recommends a provision of !40,000 million in aid to affected 
regions plus compensation to affected companies, electricity users 
and workers27–29. It has not yet been determined how much of this 
aid would be additional to already existing programmes. However, 
the magnitude of the potential commitments indicates the scale of 
the challenge of implementing a politically acceptable coal phase-
out30,31 (Supplementary Text 4).
Another Coal18 country that is similar to the PPCA members is 
Japan: it has both coal share and FoG almost identical to that of the 
Netherlands, as well as an older power plant fleet that relies entirely 
on imported coal. While Japan abandoned its plans for coal phase-
out following the downward revision of its nuclear power targets 
after the Fukushima nuclear disaster32,33, the environment min-
ister recently announced that Environment Ministry will oppose 
new construction of coal plants34. The United States and Australia 
share some of the PPCA countries’ characteristics, have subnational 
units that have joined the PPCA (Supplementary Table 2) and have 
recently declining coal power generation23. However, both countries 
are major coal producers (for example, Australia produces about 
15 times more coal per capita than Canada)23 and the current admin-
istrations in both countries are pro-coal35,36. The other 12 countries 
similar to the PPCA members have smaller power plant fleets, and 
even if they all joined, they would only increase the capacity under 
the PPCA from 4.4% to 5.3% of t e global total.
Our analysis highlights a difference between PPCA members and 
major coal users in emerging Asian economies, where the shift away 
from coal is most critical for keeping global warming under 1.5 °C 
or 2 °C (refs. 1,13). For example, the median age of coal power fleets 
across PPCA countries is 33 yr, compared with 12 yr in China (46% 
of global coal capacity), 14 yr in India (11%), 12 yr in Indonesia 
(1.4%) and 8 yr in Vietnam (0.7%) (Supplementary Table 4). The 
electricity demand change in 2006–2016 was 116% in China, 90% 
in India, 87% in Indonesia and 171% in Vietnam, whereas the aver-
age in PPCA countries was 1.5%. China in particular has large coal 
production (about 1.5 times per capita larger than Canada)23 and 
supplies 69% of its electricity from coal, but at the same time has 
much lower GDP per capita and FoG index than PPCA countries. 
Thus, the lack of a promise to phase out coal power from China and 
its recently reactivated construction of coal power plants37 are not 
surprising, despite certain steps taken to stabilize coal use38,39. China 
and some other Coal18 countries are seeking to reduce coal power, 
for example, through co-firing with biomass or partial substitution 
with natural gas, even though a nationwide coal power phase-out is 
not currently on their agenda (Supplementary Table 5).
Our analysis contributes to a broader understanding of global 
climate governance—centred on the Paris agreement—which 
involves shallow coordination between countries guided by national 
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Fig. 3 |  Functioning of Government index and share of coal in electricity generation in PPCA members, Coal18 and other countries. The size of the 
circles indicates the current coal power capacity. Coal18 countries are shown in bold and circled in black (Supplementary Tables 4 and 5). Countries with 
subnational units that have joined the PPCA are marked with an asterisk (Supplementary Table 2). The dashed line and the shaded area illustrate the 
results of the logistic regression analysis. The area to the left and above the dashed line indicates predicted probability of belonging to the alliance above 
50% according to model 1.4 (Supplement ry Tables 7–9). The shaded area shows where the probability of belonging to the alliance is at least 5%.  
See Methods for definition and calculation of variables. See Supplementary Table 11 for country code definitions.
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by 2038 or 203531 and has signaled interest in joining the PPCA32. Similarly to the PPCA countries, 
Germany plans to close older plants in the coming decade: the units proposed to close in 2022 will be on 
average 46 years old and in 2030 – 41 years old, as compared to the recent average lifetime of 41 years. 
However, the final stage of the phase-out would break with this pattern by closing many of the recently-
constructed power plants. The average age of the remaining units, comprising about 1/3 of the current 
capacity, would be 30 years in 2038 (Supplementary Figure 7, Supplementary Text 4). An evaluation 
planned for 2032 may reverse this decision or accelerate it to 2035. The German coal exit would avoid 
0.6-1.6 GtCO2 emissions between 2019-2050 depending on the final phase-out date and how much coal 
will be substituted by natural gas. The plan recommends a provision of €40 bln in aid to affected regions 
plus compensation to affected companies, electricity users and workers33–35. It is not yet determined how 
much of this aid would be additional to already existing programs. However, the magnitude of the 
potential commitments indicates the scale of the challenge of implementing a politically acceptable coal 
phase-out36,37 (Supplementary Text 4). 
Another Coal18 country similar to the PPCA members is Japan: it has both coal share and FoG almost 
identical to that of the Netherlands, as well as an older power plant fleet relying entirely on imported coal. 
While Japan abandoned its plans for coal phase-out following the downward revision of its nuclear power 
targets after the Fukushima accident38,39, the Environment Minister recently announced it will oppose 
new construction of coal plants40. The US and Australia share some of the PPCA countries’ 
characteristics, have subnational units which have joined the PPCA (Supplementary Table 1), and have 
been reducing coal power generation19. However, both countries are major coal producers (e.g. Australia 
produces about 15 times more coal per capita than Canada)19 and the current administrations in both 
countries are pro-coal41,42. The other 12 countries similar to the PPCA members have smaller power plant 
fleets and even if all of these joined, it would only increase the capacity under PPCA from 4.4 to 5.3% of 
the global total. 
Our analysis highlights a difference between PPCA members and major coal users in emerging Asian 
economies, where the shift away from coal is most critical for keeping global warming under 1.5°C or 
2°C1,13. For example, the median age of coal power fleets across PPCA countries is 33 years compared to 
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12 years in China (46% of global coal capacity), 14 years in India (11%), 12 years in Indonesia (1.4%), and 
8 years in Vietnam (0.7%) (Supplementary Table 4). The electricity demand change in 2006-2016 was 
116% in China, 90% in India, 87% in Indonesia, and 171% in Vietnam while in PPCA countries it was 
1.5% on average. China in particular has large coal production (about 1.5 times per capita larger than 
Canada)19, supplies 69% of its electricity from coal, but at the same time has much lower GDP per capita 
and FoG than PPCA countries. Thus, the lack of China’s promise to phase-out coal power and its 
recently reactivated construction of coal power plants43 are not surprising, despite certain steps to 
stabilize coal use44,45. China and some other Coal18 countries do seek to reduce coal power, e.g. through 
co-firing with biomass or partial substitution with natural gas, even though a nation-wide coal power 
phase-out is not currently on their agenda (Supplementary Table 5). 
Our analysis contributes to a broader understanding of the global climate governance – centered on the 
Paris agreement – which involves “shallow” coordination between countries guided by national interests 
rather than by joint gains46. One common suggestion for deepening climate cooperation is with climate 
clubs whereby a group of countries jointly commit to stronger climate mitigation46–48. The literature 
suggests that access to clean technologies, reduced air pollution and similar benefits could incentivize 
countries to join climate clubs46,48. By analyzing the PPCA we provide a new perspective to this debate. 
Our analysis shows that it is not the benefits of PPCA membership but the costs of phase-out and 
capacities to bear these costs that differentiate PPCA members from non-members. Specifically, countries 
pledge to phase-out coal only when potential stranded assets, employment losses, regional impacts and 
other costs are lower. The exceptions are the Netherlands and Germany, which makes it especially 
important to analyze the lessons and the feasibility of replicating the mechanisms of these countries’ coal 
phase-out elsewhere (see ref. 49 for emerging discussion on Germany). 
We also show that lower costs of coal’s demise are not sufficient to trigger phase-out pledges. A small 
coal sector and aging power plants provide a space for policy choice to either accelerate phase-out or to 
prop a declining coal sector with extra government support. The difficult process of coal phase-out is 
more likely to be pursued by independent and transparent governments in wealthy countries which have 
capacities to bear substantial political, social and economic costs, as Germany’s case illustrates. Therefore, 
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even the declining competitiveness of coal50,51 will not automatically lead to its demise, particularly in non-
liberalized markets with governments under influence from the coal sector. On the contrary, such 
governments may choose to boost the use of uncompetitive coal through favorable regulations and 
supportive subsidies as in some post-Soviet countries52–54. Returning to the more general question of why 
countries join climate clubs, our findings indicate that the affordable “entrance fee” may matter more 
than lucrative “membership benefits”. 
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Methods 
Data sources 
We compiled pledged phase-out dates for PPCA members from national and sub-national sources (see 
Table 1 and Supplementary Table 1)18,21–23,25,55–57. All power plant data are from the World Electric Power 
Plant Database from S&P Global Platts20. (We used the S&P Global Platts database rather than the 
EndCoal tracker57 because Platts has historical data from before 2000 which allowed us to calculate 
historical retirement ages – e.g. Supplementary Figure 3). All other energy data are from the International 
Energy Agency (IEA) for the year 201619 unless specified otherwise. Economic data are from the World 
Bank and for the year 201658 and the Functioning of Government data is from Freedom House for the 
year 200628. We were not able to obtain economic data for North Korea, which would otherwise be in 
our sample for statistical analysis, thus we excluded it. The scenario data are from the IPCC’s 1.5°C 
report16,17. 
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For the Coal18 countries, we evaluate whether there are coal phase-out plans in by: searching for 
“Country name + coal plan” and “Country name + coal phase-out” and consulting the Nationally 
Determined Contribution59 and most recent National Communications60 submitted to the United 
Nations Framework on Climate Change since the Paris Agreement or the National Energy and Climate 
Plans submitted to the European Commission61 ( Supplementary Table 5). 
Calculating power plant age profiles and average retirement age 
To calculate the average age of the existing fleet, we only include plants which are classified as operating 
(Status = OPR). We calculate the age of each plant by subtracting the year of its construction from 2019. 
We then take the average (weighted by nameplate capacity). To calculate the “theoretical average & 
(minimum) age at phase-out”, we add the number of years from the pledged phase-out date and 2019 to 
the current average age of the existing fleet.  
Average power plant lifetimes are calculated for each PPCA member and Germany as a mean across all 
retired power plants for which retirement information is available since 2000. For countries with fewer 
than 4 data-points, a mean across all power plants lifetimes in PPCA countries (42 years) is used; for 
subnational jurisdictions with fewer than 4 data-points, national averages are used if they have 4 data-
points or more, and global averages are used otherwise. We use a similar procedure to estimate standard 
deviations of retirement ages.  
These data are used to estimate the share of power plants which would be retired prematurely due to the 
pledges from PPCA members (Table 1 and Supplementary Table 1). We assume that plant retirement age 
follows a normal distribution with historical means and standard deviations. For our reference estimate, 
we use national and subnational historic retirement ages and standard deviations calculated as described 
above. In future scenarios, all operating plants start retiring from 2019, and the retirement date of a plant 
is determined by its expected lifetime in 2019, which is estimated using truncated normal distribution 
(Supplementary Figure 8). It ensures that plants already past the respective national average age do not 
retire immediately at the start of the period – they still have a positive expected lifetime determined by the 
remaining “tail” of the distribution.  
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In the phase-out scenario, in additional to the business as usual retirement described above, all plants 
surviving to the respective national, state, or provincial phaseout year are retired in that year. For 
Germany, the phase-out scenarios correspond to the multi-stage coal phase-out plan proposed by the 
Coal Commission31 (Supplementary Text 4). For our sensitivity analysis, we also use fixed average 
lifetimes for all plants in all PPCA members (20, 30, 40, 50, and 60 years), applying the same truncated 
normal distribution retirement procedure and using the standard deviation of plant lifetimes in all PPCA 
countries scaled proportionally to the average lifetime (so that the ratio of the standard deviation to the 
mean remains constant). In this analysis, we include national, state and provincial PPCA member pledges. 
Calculating avoided emissions from plant retirement 
To calculate the avoided emissions from premature retirement, we calculate the avoided generation from 
each prematurely retired plant by multiplying its capacity by the number of years between the premature 
and the baseline retirement dates and by the load factor. We use average national load factors for 2007–
2016 by dividing coal-fired power plant output19 by installed coal capacity20. For states and provinces, we 
use national load factors19 by installed coal capacity20 for each year. For states and provinces, we use 
national load factors. 
We then apply technology-specific efficiencies to the power output of each plant to estimate coal 
consumption (in energy units) using the average between two different references (see Supplementary 
Table 11)62,63. We then use emission rates for the thermal content of different coal types for power plants 
with known fuel types to estimate avoided emissions (Supplementary Table 12)64. For plants with 
unknown fuel type, we use 95.3 kg/MBTU which is the average across all currently operating plants with 
known fuel type, weighted by installed capacity. Finally, total avoided emissions are calculated by 
summing across all plants between 2019 and 2050 (at which point all coal power plants in PPCA member 
countries with pledged phase-out date would be retired).We then apply worldwide technology-specific 
efficiencies (differentiating between sub-critical, super-critical and ultra supercritical generation 
technologies) to the power output of each plant to estimate coal consumption (in energy units) using the 
average between two different references (see Supplementary Table 11)62,63. Where the technology is not 
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indicated, sub-critical technology is assumed. We then use emission rates for the thermal content of 
different coal types for power plants with known fuel types to estimate avoided emissions (Supplementary 
Table 12)64. For plants with unknown fuel type, we use 95.3 kg/MBTU which is the average across all 
currently operating plants with known fuel type, weighted by installed capacity. Finally, total avoided 
emissions are calculated by summing across all plants between 2019 and 2050 (at which point all coal 
power plants in PPCA member countries with pledged phase-out date would be retired). For calculating 
potential emissions from natural gas in case it substitutes coal power we use the US average efficiency of 
gas-fired power plants in 2007-2017 (43%)65 and the CO2 emission factor for gas 53.07 kg/Mbtu65.  
Scenario comparison 
In Figure 1 (panel b), we compare how coal generation changes under the PPCA pledges to climate 
scenarios from the literature16,17. For the “BAU” or Business as Usual scenarios, we selected all scenarios 
which had, “Current policies”, “No policies”, “Baseline”, or “BAU” in their name or definition. For the 
“2°C” scenarios, we selected all scenarios in the Categories: “Higher 2C” and “Lower 2C”. For the 
“1.5°C” scenarios, we selected all scenarios in the Categories: “1.5C low overshoot”, “1.5C high 
overshoot” and “Below 1.5C”. 
Variable definition for comparative analysis and logistic regression 
Selection of variables for logistic regression and comparative analysis is explained in Supplementary Text 
2. The following is the list of variables in our logistic regression and data sources: 
• Coal.Share – share of coal in electricity supply in 2016. Calculated as a ratio of electricity 
produced from coal to the total domestic electricity supply. Data source: ref. 19. 
• Prod.PC – coal production per capita, toe/person, in 2016. Data sources: coal production – ref. 
19, population – ref. 58. 
• Coal.TFC – share of coal in non-transport final energy consumption. Calculated as share of coal 
in total final energy consumption excluding the transport sector (i.e. capturing coal use in 
industry, residential and public and commercial sectors) in 2016. Transportation sector was 
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excluded to avoid the extent of transport sector affecting the final results.  Data source: ref. 19. 
• Coal.Indep – import independence of coal supply. Calculated as a ratio of domestic coal 
production to the total domestic supply of coal. If the ratio is greater than one (i.e. the country is 
a net coal exporter), the indicator equals one by definition (meaning “full independence of 
supply”). Data source: ref. 19. 
• Demand10 – change in electricity demand over 10 years (2006–2016). Calculated as an absolute 
difference between the total electricity demand in 2016 and 2006 divided by the total electricity 
demand in the base year (2006). Data source: ref. 19. 
• Age – weighted (by installed capacity) average age of operating coal-fired power plants. Plant age 
is as of 2019. Data source: ref. 20. 
• NHR.Share – share of non-hydro renewables in total electricity supply in 2016. Data source: ref. 
19. 
• PM2.5.Exp – air pollution, measured as mean annual exposure to PM2.5 (μg/m3), in 2016. Data 
source: ref. 58. 
• GDP.PC – GDP per capita (in 1 000 current USD) in 2016. Data source: ref. 58. 
• FoG – Functioning of government as measured by an index published by Freedom House, 
which measures on the scale from 0 to 12 the absence of undue influence on elected authorities, 
effectiveness of safeguards against political corruption, and openness and transparency of 
government operation. Data source: ref. 28. 
Logistic regression analysis 
We conduct a multivariate statistical analysis using a two-sided logistic model to analyze which variables 
best predict PPCA membership and which countries are most likely to join in the future. The binary 
outcome variable is PPCA membership. Our sample includes the 68 countries which supply at least 1% 
of their electricity from coal and for which all our independent variables are available (this excludes North 
Korea, for which there was no GDP data available). Though PPCA membership of other countries using 
negligible quantities of coal power is symbolically important, its tangible impacts on climate mitigation are 
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likely to be insignificant. 
In the first step we analyze all possible models (2036) including at least two of the 11 explanatory 
variables. Models where PM2.5.exp is statistically significant show its unexpected negative correlation with 
PPCA membership. This is in contrast to the presumed causal mechanism and thus possibly indicates a 
model deficiency. PM2.5.exp is therefore excluded from further analysis (Supplementary Text 2, 
Supplementary Text 3). 
In the second step we analyze all possible models (1013) involving a combination of at least 2 of the 
remaining 10 variables. These machine-generated models are ranked by the Akaike information criterion 
(AIC) which estimates the goodness of fit and also rewards model parsimony by penalizing additional 
independent variables67; a lower AIC means better model fit. In addition, we test how many ‘false 
predictions’ of membership in PPCA each model produces (a prediction is a false negative if an actual 
PPCA member has less than 50% of probability to be a PPCA member according to a given model and 
false positive if a non-member is predicted by the model to be a member with higher than 50% 
probability – Supplementary Table 7).  
This machine-generated procedure follows the general logic of step-wise regression using backwards 
elimination, starting with a model containing all of our independent variables and then testing a number 
of reduced models by dropping statistically insignificant variables one-by-one and testing different 
variable combinations (as illustrated in Supplementary Table 7)68.  
 The best-fit parsimonious model resulting from this procedure includes FoG, GDP.PC, Prod.PC, 
Coal.TFC and Coal.Share; the best-fit model with only two variables, includes Coal.Share and the FoG 
(models 1.3 and 1.4, Supplementary Table 7, 8 and 9). We also use the likelihood ratio test69 to make sure 
that no significant information is lost when dropping variables from the best-fit and 2-variable model (i.e. 
that the variables dropped from the full model are not statistically significant collectively). Finally, to 
investigate collective statistical significance of the variables characterizing the coal sector (Coal.Share. 
Coal.TFC, and Prod.PC) and which highly correlate with each other (Supplementary Figure 6) we 
conduct an additional likelihood ratio test69 focused on these variable (Supplementary Text 3).  
19 
Limitations 
Our paper focuses on the impact and potential diffusion of a specific policy measure: deliberate, nation-
wide, time-bound, universal phase-out of unabated coal power. We do not analyze other policies (e.g. 
carbon tax) that can reduce emissions from coal power or indirectly lead to closure of coal power plants. 
We also do not analyze potential closures of coal power plants due to market dynamics, technological 
change, and other factors not explicitly reflected in deliberate phase-out policies. 
In our reference estimate of avoided emissions, we presume that phased-out coal generation will be 
compensated by nearly-zero carbon measures such as electricity demand reduction or, in a sensitivity 
estimate, by natural gas power. However, we do not analyze the whole range of substitution options, 
some of which may lead to much higher emissions. This can occur, for example, as a result of a 
“waterbed effect” when decline in coal generation in PPCA countries could lead to an increase in coal 
generation elsewhere either because of a drop in coal prices or due to an increase in opportunities to 
export coal-based electricity to those countries.  
On the other hand, our analysis may underestimate the potential effect of PPCA by not including the 
cancellation of planned or possible coal power plants. Though we show that the majority of PPCA 
countries have not built many new coal power plants in the last two decades (and thus are unlikely to 
have had many concrete plans for construction) we could not obtain reliable and systematic information 
on how many coal power plants were cancelled during the planning stage, when and whether the 
membership in PPCA could have played any role. 
With respect to explaining PPCA membership and discussing its potential for its further expansion our 
first limitation stems from our focus on nation-states. Explaining PPCA memberships of sub-national 
jurisdictions as well as private corporations would require a different explanatory framework and different 
variables. The second limitation is more generally connected with statistical analysis which identifies 
correlation between variables rather than causal relationships. Although we base our variable selection on 
plausible causal mechanisms and a rich theoretical and empirical literature (Supplementary Text 2), 
validating these mechanisms would require detailed case-study research. 
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Supplementary Figure 1. Historical trends of coal power generation in PPCA countries. 
Includes countries with at least 3% of electricity supply from coal in any year since 1990. Each graph 
shows the change in coal generation since 1990, normalized to the maximum value for that country. 
The trend-line is calculated from the year when coal generation peaked (or 1990 if the peak was prior 
to 1990) and the green dot represents the pledged phase-out date. The text indicates peak year, peak 
annual coal-based generation, and peak percent of coal power in total electricity supply (TES). Most 
PPCA countries pledge to phase-out coal power in line with historical trends. Data from IEA1. Pledge 
date from Table 1 (none for Mexico).  
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Supplementary Figure 2. New coal power plant construction since 1990. Panel (a) shows PPCA 
members and all other countries. Panel (b) shows PPCA members (with the Netherlands and Mexico 
separate) and OECD countries which are not PPCA members with linear trends of construction since 
1990 projected through to 2020. 
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Supplementary Figure 3. Retirement ages of coal power plants in PPCA countries, the UK, 
Spain and Germany in 1990-2019. Data are from Platts2. The trend line shows time-dependent 




Supplementary Figure 4. Sensitivity analysis for avoided emissions. The horizontal line and the 
cross represent the reference estimate based on national lifetimes and reference load factors and 
efficiencies. The solid line shows how avoided emissions depend on different mean lifetime 
assumptions. The upper dotted line shows how the avoided emissions would change with 10% higher 
load factor and 10% lower efficiency and the lower dotted line shows how the avoided emissions 
would change with 10% lower load factor and 10% higher efficiency. The dashed line shows how the 
central estimate of avoided emissions would change if coal power is replaced with natural gas instead 
of zero-emission sources. The shaded area shows the range of observed average lifetimes in PPCA 




Supplementary Figure 5. Coal power plant fleet under different mean lifetime assumptions with 
and without retirements forced by PPCA pledges.  Future retirements in the baseline (color bars) 
and forced by PPCA pledges (dashed line) follow the truncated normal distribution procedure we 





Supplementary Figure 6. Correlation matrix for independent variables. The color and shade of 
each cell in the matrix indicates the sign and the value of correlation between the two corresponding 




Supplementary Figure 7. Capacity of coal power plants in Germany in the baseline and the two 
phase-out scenarios, 1960-2060. Color bars indicate historical and projected capacity by age cohort. 
Black lines indicate the proposed phase-out scenarios. Projected capacity is calculated by the method 
described in the Method section of the main text and Supplementary Text 4 for 2019-2060 for the 
baseline and the two phase-out scenarios. Historical capacity is based on ref. 2 and phase-out 
scenarios on ref. 6. The figure shows the new construction in Germany after 2010 and also that the 
bulk of premature coal power plant retirements is planned for either 2035 or 2038 (see Supplementary 




Supplementary Figure 8. Using truncated normal distribution to estimate expected plant 
lifetime. In the example, the average retirement age for an illustrative group of power plants (e.g. in a 
particular country) is 40 years with a standard deviation of 7 years. The illustrative plant was launched 
in 1972 and has survived to 2019, when it was 47 years, which is past the average lifetime. The 
expected lifetime of this plant is determined by the part of the normal distribution starting in 2019 – the 
truncated normal distribution (unshaded area under the curve). For this particular plant the expected 
retirement year is approximately 2023 (2022.7). In our projections of future baseline retirement, we 
will retire this plant in 2023 when it will be ca 51 years old rather than immediately in 2019 (when it 





Supplementary Table 1. Cumulative avoided emissions for PPCA members. Includes PPCA 
members with non-zero avoided emissions in the reference estimate. 
























Italy 423.1 27.7 695.9 377.8 512.0 355.5 
Netherlands 374.5 92.5 520.0 334.4 453.1 164.0 
Israel 168.9 0.0 564.0 150.8 204.3 66.6 
Canada 149.7 5.6 744.9 133.7 181.1 572.8 
New York (US) 85.2 0.0 100.2 76.0 103.0 164.5 
France 81.8 0.0 265.1 73.1 99.0 356.3 
Washington (US) 54.6 0.0 70.2 48.7 66.0 81.0 
United Kingdom 45.3 0.0 619.8 40.4 54.8 384.7 
Ireland 30.4 0.0 136.9 27.2 36.8 39.7 
Portugal 26.1 0.0 200.5 23.3 31.5 54.9 
Hawaii (US) 24.5 0.0 29.1 21.9 29.6 18.5 
Oregon (US) 20.8 0.0 34.7 18.6 25.2 37.9 
Connecticut (US) 19.4 0.0 21.6 17.3 23.5 34.4 
Balearic Islands 
(Spain) 
19.0 0.0 41.6 16.9 23.0 - 
Denmark 17.7 0.0 150.3 15.8 21.4 34.6 
Finland 17.2 0.0 135.8 15.3 20.8 46.0 
South Chungcheong, 
(South Korea) 
14.9 0.0 39.3 13.3 18.0 - 
Sweden 7.8 0.0 21.3 7.0 9.4 41.5 
Austria 4.0 0.0 65.6 3.5 4.8 69.9 
New Zealand 0.1 0.0 32.5 0.1 0.1 36.0 
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Supplementary Table 2. Phase-out dates and the capacity, number and age of coal power plant 
units of subnational members. The pledged phase-out dates are compiled from national sources as 
referenced in Column 2. All power plant and lifetime data are calculated based on Platts2. Average 
fleet ages are weighted by generation capacity and calculated as of 2019. The theoretical average 
and minimum ages at phase-out are calculated by adding the 2019 ages to the number of years 
between 2019 and the phase-out date (see Methods). The average national lifetimes are calculated 
as the mean of plants retiring since 2000. 
Jurisdiction 
Country 
State or Province 
City 



















Australia none 70 (24.2) 32 (7) - 43 (31) 
Australian Capital 
Territory 
no operating plants - - - - 
City of Melbourne no operating plants - - - - 
City of Sydney no operating plants - - - - 
Canada phase-out 203010 33 (9.1) 33 (5) 44 (16) 41 (33) 
Alberta phase-out 203011 15 (5.7) 32 (8) 43 (19) see above 
British Columbia no operating plants - - - - 
City of Vancouver no operating plants - - - - 
Ontario no operating plants - - - - 
Quebec no operating plants - - - - 
Netherlands phase-out 203012,13 6 (4.8) 10 (3) 21 (14) 36 (28) 
City of Rotterdam no additional phase-out date 1 (0.8) 5 (5) 16 (16) see above 
Spain none 35 (10.2) 37 (22) - 43 (21) 
Balearic Islands phase-out 202514 4 (0.5) 30 (22) 37 (29) see above 
South Korea none 107 (34.2) 17 (2) - 35 (34) 
South Chungcheong phase-out 205015 28 (16.2) 17 (2) 46 (33) see above 
UK phase-out 202512,13 45 (15.3) 47 (28) 53 (34) 44 (34) 
Scotland phased out 201616 - - - - 
Wales no additional phase-out date 4 (1.6) 44 (40) 50 (46) see above 
US none 901 (282.4) 41 (5) - 53 (1) 
California phased-out (2016)17 - - - - 
City of Los Angeles no operating plants - - - - 
New York phase-out 202018,19 8 (1.1) 44 (32) 45 (33) see above 
Connecticut phase-out 202120 1 (0.4) 51 (51) 53 (53) see above 
Hawaii phase-out 202221 1 (0.2) 27 (27) 30 (30) see above 
City of Honolulu no operating plants - - - - 
Washington phase-out 202522 4 (1.4) 46 (43) 52 (49) see above 
Oregon phase-out 203023 1 (0.6) 39 (39) 50 (50) see above 




Supplementary Table 3. Effect of uncertainties on avoided emissions benchmarked against 
globally committed emissions from coal.  Columns 2-4 show emissions avoided as a result of 
PPCA pledges (GtCO2) under the given assumptions about coal power plants lifetime, loads, and 
efficiency if coal power is replaced by zero-carbon sources. The shaded row shows the reference 
estimate based on national average lifetimes. Column 5 shows the estimate with reference load and 
efficiency under different lifetime assumptions if coal is replaced by natural gas. Column 6 shows 




10% higher load & 
lower efficiency 
10% lower load & 
higher efficiency 
Replacement 




20-year mean 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.05 66.2 
30-year mean 0.5 0.6 0.4 0.2 128.3 
40-year mean 1.2 1.4 1.0 0.6 206.1 
42-year mean 1.4 1.7 1.1 0.7  
National average 1.6 1.9 1.3 0.8  
50-year mean 2.6 3.0 2.1 1.3 295.7 
60-year mean 4.5 5.4 3.7 2.4 390.3 
 
Supplementary Table 4. Coal18 countries and the percent of global installed coal capacity and 
global coal-fired generation. All power plant age data are calculated based on Platts2. Average 
ages are weighted by generation capacity and calculated as of 2019. 




% of global 
coal-fired 
generation1 
Number & (GWe) 








GWe (Number of 
units)2 
China 46.1 % 44.2 % 3018 (915) 12 (2) 91 (147) 
US 14.2 % 14.1 % 901 (282) 41 (5) 0.02 (1) 
India 11.3 % 11.5 % 1328 (223) 14 (2) 53 (105) 
Russia 2.6 % 1.8 % 472 (51) 40 (3) 0.2 (4) 
Germany 2.4 % 2.8 % 196 (48) 30 (3) 1 (1) 
Japan 2.2 % 3.6 % 161 (44) 24 (3) 2 (4) 
South Africa 2.1 % 2.4 % 126 (41) 34 (2) 7 (9) 
South Korea 1.7 % 2.4 % 107 (34) 17 (2) 6 (7) 
Poland 1.6 % 1.4 % 524 (32) 39 (3) 4 (5) 
Indonesia 1.4 % 1.4 % 225 (27) 12 (2) 9 (38) 
Ukraine 1.2 % 0.6 % 125 (25) 48 (5) 0.2 (1) 
Australia 1.2 % 1.7 % 70 (24) 32 (7) - 
Turkey 0.9 % 1.0 % 103 (17) 18 (3) 2 (3) 
Vietnam 0.7 % 0.6 % 53 (14) 8 (2) 10 (18) 
Kazakhstan 0.6 % 0.7 % 124 (12) 39 (3) 2 (3) 
Malaysia 0.6 % 0.7 % 21 (11) 12 (2) 3 (4) 
Spain 0.5 % 0.4 % 35 (10) 37 (22) - 
Czech Republic 0.5 % 0.5 % 160 (9) 43 (4) 1 (4) 
Total 91.8% 91.9% 7749 (1819) 21 (2) 191 (354) 
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Supplementary Table 5. National coal power plant plans for Coal 18 countries. 
Country Plan 
Australia No phase-out plans 
Australia’s INDC does not mention coal26 however the 7th NC from 2017 states that there is 
a “withdrawal from coal-fired generation” with more than 2 GWe coal-fired electricity 
assumed to be retired after 2020 replaced by existing coal generation and some gas27. 
Australia has had carbon pricing which compromised the competitiveness of coal, and most 
argue that at this point renewables competes with coal-fired installations but the current 
government is a coal supporter28. This is illustrated by the Australia prime minister’s 
rejection of recommendations from the IPCC’s 1.5°C report saying Australia was committed 
to coal power29. 
China No phase-out plans 
China’s INDC plans to “control total coal consumption”, “enhance” clean coal, and improve 
coal efficiency30. China’s 2020 Air Pollution Action Act plans for steps to curb coal use31, 
however recent analysis shows recently-reactivated construction of coal plants32. 
Czech 
Republic 
No phase-out plans 
An NGO lobbying for coal phase-out across Europe reports that no coal phase-out is under 
discussion in the Czech Republic33, however the country’s National Climate and Energy 
plan submitted to the European Commission plans for decreasing the proportion of coal in 
the energy mix in favor of nuclear34. 
Germany Proposed phase-out plan by 2038 or 2035 
In January 2019, the commission for ‘growth, structural change and employment’ published 
a report outlining a multi-stakeholder compromise on a multi-stage plan for phase-out of 
coal power plants in Germany by 2035 at the earliest and 2038 at the latest6. See: 
Supplementary Text 4. Proposed coal phase-out in Germany. 
India No phase-out plans 
India’s INDC states “coal will continue to dominate power generation in the future”35. India’s 
National Electricity Plan includes about 90 GWe of coal power expansion from 2017-202736. 
Indonesia No phase-out plans 
Indonesia’s NDC commits to implementation of clean coal technology in coal power plants37 
and the business as usual in Indonesia’s National Climate Communication from 2017 
depicts significant growth in coal-fired power (and the development of clean coal 
technology)38. 
Japan No phase-out plans 
Neither Japan’s INDC39 nor the most recent NC40 mentions a reduction in coal power. 
Japan’s 2018 also Strategic Energy Plan does not foresee a decrease in coal power41,42.  
Kazakhstan No phase-out plans 
Kazakhstan’s INDC does not mention coal43. The 7th NC from 2017 contains a series of 
technical activities which was adopted in 2013 including: replacing coal-fired power with 
gas-fired CHP plants in population centers, an audit of all coal power plants which will 
continue to run after 2020, and replacing current coal capacities with modern coal power 
plants44. Nevertheless, the NC is clear that coal generation will continue to be the main 
source of energy until 2030, with a restriction of an increase in its share and growth of coal 
bed methane. 
Korea No phase-out plans 
Korea’s INDC does not mention coal power45. According to the 8th Basic Plan for Long-term 
Electricity Supply and Demand from 2017, the Korean government plans to  expand coal 
power from 36.8 GWe to 39.9 GWe by 203046.  
Malaysia No phase-out plans 
Malaysia’s NDC does not mention coal47. Malayia’s NC targets that no new coal power 
plants to be built after 202548.  
Poland No phase-out plans 
According to Poland’s National Climate and Energy Plan, “the leading role of coal is planned 
to be maintained” but its relative share will decrease to 60% in 2030 (from today’s 77%) due 
to energy demand growth, the decommissioning of old coal plants and the implementation 
of high-efficiency coal technologies49. 
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Country Plan 
Russia No phase-out plans 
Russia’s INDC50 and the 7th NC from 201751 do not mention reducing coal power. Russia’s 
Energy Strategy published in 2017 contains measures to protect coal production and does 
not envision reducing the share of coal in its electricity mix52. The Master Plan for power 
plants construction envisions construction of numerous new coal power plants to replace the 
aging ones and somewhat increased use of coal in those power plants53. 
South 
Africa 
No phase-out plans 
South Africa’s INDC speaks of a “complete transformation of the future energy mix, which is 
designed to replace an inefficient fleet of ageing coal-fired power plants with clean and high 
efficiency technology going forward” (including with high-efficiency coal)54. However, South 
Africa’s most recent National Communication says that “[c]oal is an important part of South 
Africa’s energy mix and will continue to drive economic and social progress of much of the 
developing world for the foreseeable future”55. South Africa’s new Integrated Resource Plan 
calls for a halt in construction of coal-fired power plants with new demand met by 
renewables, gas and other sources56. However, this plan does not lead to significant 
reductions in generation capacity by 2030, but the Ministry plans to decommission 28 GW 
by 2040 and 35 GW by 2050 reducing the proportion of coal-based electricity to 17-42% by 
2050 (compared to today’s 81%).  
Spain Possible phase-out by 2030 
An NGO lobbying for coal phase-out across Europe reports that no coal phase-out is under 
discussion in Spain33, however the country’s National Climate and Energy plan submitted to 
the European Commission states that coal-fired electricity will not supply electricity beyond 
203057 and the country has already committed to closing all coal mines by the end of 
201858. 
Turkey No phase-out plans 
Turkey’s NDC does not mention coal59 and the 7th NC includes plans for increasing the use 
of coal power plants60. 
Ukraine No phase-out plans 
Ukraine’s NDC does not refer to coal61. According to the more recent National Emission 
Reduction Plan for Large Combustion Plants62, Ukraine’s strategy is not to phase-out coal 
power generation but rather to replace obsolete and inefficient power plants with more 
flexible and efficient facilities. More specifically it presumes to replace ca 7.1 GW of coal 
power plants by more efficient ones (of the same or larger capacity) by 2023. Each of these 
facilities will not be allowed to operate for more than 20,000 hours during 2018-2023. In the 
second phase of modernisation, additional 11.4 GW of capacity will be replaced by newer 
plants in 2024-2033. Each of these plants will be allowed to operate for max of 40000 hours 
within this period. 
US No phase-out plans 
The US NDC pledges significant reduction of emissions from electricity generation resulting 
primarily from substituting coal by natural gas and other sources63,64. A notable reduction of 
coal use in electricity has been driven by market factors from the late 2010s65. The 2015 
Clean Power Plan66 contained measures to accelerate this reduction, but it has been 
challenged and virtually repealed by the current US Administration64. Nevertheless the 
market-driven reduction of coal use is likely to continue into the future63. 
Vietnam No phase-out plans 
Vietnam’s INDC does not mention coal67 but Vietnam’s 3rd NC from February 2019 states 
that ultra-super critical coal power generation is the highest priority for the power generation 
sector68. Vietnam’s energy plan assumes continued growth and an addition of some 40 
GWe of coal-fired power plants between 2015 and 203069 though a statement by the Prime 




Supplementary Table 6. Key characteristics of all coal-consuming countries and country 
groups PPCA and Coal 18. (See Methods for data and calculation). 
Country group All PPCA Coal 18 
Number of countries 68 14 18 
EU members 21 (31%) 10 (71%) 4 (22%) 
Share of global coal-fired 
capacity, % 
100 % 3.2 % 91.8 % 
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Supplementary Table 7. Logistic regression results (selected models) with PPCA membership 
as dependent variable. Standard errors in parentheses. *p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. “FP” refers 
to the number of false positives (countries incorrectly predicted as PPCA members); “FN” refers to the 
number of false negatives (PPCA members incorrectly predicted as non-members). Model 1.1 is the 
full model with all 10 dependent variables. Model 1.2 illustrates the process of step-wise backward 
elimination to improve AIC. Model 1.3 is the best-fit model (out of 1013 tested). Model 1.4 is the best 
model with only 2 variables (see Figure 3 in the main text). Model 1.5 illustrates that replacing FOG 
with EU in model 1.4 worsens model fit and predictive power. 
Model (1.1) (1.2) (1.3) (1.4) (1.5) 
Observations 68 68 68 68 68 
Coal.Share -4.564(4.967) -6.407(4.375) -6.32(4.265) -9.243(3.931)** -4.42(3.554) 
Coal.Indep 1.369(2.809) -0.692(1.948)    
Dem10 -3.36(7.195)     
Age 0.017(0.075) 0.014(0.055)    
GDP.PC 0.086(0.048)*  0.072(0.038)*  0.109(0.035)*** 
FOG 0.884(0.639) 1.222(0.436)*** 1.131(0.503)** 1.167(0.373)***  
Prod.PC -6.216(4.051) -1.923(2.997) -3.749(2.205)*  -2.104(1.886) 
NHR.Share 6.121(9.287)     
Coal.TFC -49.485(32.971) -21.913(19.076) -37.25(27.065)  -20.297(19.932) 
EU -1.695(2.214)    0.991(1.012) 
AIC 43.17 40.56 34.64 36.33 41.76 
Prediction 
FP/FN 
3/1 2/3 2/2 1/2 2/5 
 
Supplementary Table 8. Detailed regression results for selected models. Models 1.3 and 1.4 are 
according to Supplementary Table 7. 
Term Estimate Std. error Z-score P-value Conf. intervals 
Model 1.3 
(Intercept) -11.36 4.75 -2.39 0.017 [-23.33; -4.04] 
Coal.Share -6.32 4.27 -1.48 0.138 [-16.21; 1.39] 
GDP.PC 0.0718 0.0383 1.87 0.061 [0.002; .16] 
FOG 1.13 0.5 2.25 0.025 [0.31; 2.37] 
Prod.PC -3.75 2.21 -1.7 0.089 [-8.98; -0.16] 
Coal.TFC -37.25 27.07 -1.38 0.169 [-103.16; 6.59] 
Model 1.4 
(Intercept) -10.49 3.43 -3.06 0.002 [-19.06; -5.13] 
Coal.Share -9.24 3.93 -2.35 0.019 [-18.97; -3.04] 




Supplementary Table 9. Average marginal effects for logistic regression in selected models. 




GDP.PC    0.0038 
FOG 0.060 
Prod.PC -0.20    
Coal.TFC -1.97 
Model 1.4 
Coal.Share   -0.66 
FOG 0.083 
 
Supplementary Table 10. Selected illustrative models with PM2.5 exposure included as an 
independent variable. PPCA membership is the dependent variable. Standard errors in 
parentheses. *p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. “FP” refers to the number of false positives (countries 
incorrectly predicted as PPCA members); “FN” refers to the number of false negatives (PPCA 
members incorrectly predicted as non-members). See Supplementary Text 3 for discussion. 
Model (2.1) (2.2) (2.3) 




GDP.PC 0.136(0.057)** 0.081(0.039)** 0.116(0.048)** 
Prod.PC -11.135(5.254)** -5.117(2.153)** -9.467(4.764)** 
PM2.5.Exp -0.357(0.154)** -0.276(0.135)** -0.304(0.128)** 






AIC 33.39 34.62 34.67 
FP/FN 3/2 1/2 2/4 
 
Supplementary Table 11. Technology-specific production efficiencies for coal plants. 
Technology Katzer et al.71 Hardisty et al.72 Average 
Subcritical 34.3% 33% 33.7% 
Supercritical 38.5% 41% 39.8% 
Ultra-supercritical 43.3% 43% 43.2% 
 
Supplementary Table 12. Emission factors for different types of coal73. 







Supplementary Text 1. Sensitivity analysis 
We conduct a sensitivity analysis on (1) the percent of prematurely retired plants from the 
pledges of PPCA members, (2) the avoided emissions from PPCA pledges and (3) the reduction 
of coal-fired generation in 2030.  
For the percent of prematurely retired plants (1), our findings would change if we varied the 
assumed coal power plant lifetime on either the lifetimes. This would range between 11-68% 
under a standard lifetime uncertainty range of 30 to 50 years74,75, and between 7-87% under the 
widest assumed lifetime range of 20 to 60 years76 (Supplementary Text 1). 
For the avoided emissions (2), we test the sensitivity of our results to the assumed plant 
lifetimes, plant efficiencies and load factors, as well as what would substitute coal generation 
(Supplementary Figure 4 and Supplementary Table 3). For calculating the premature retirement, 
for the central estimate, we use the average national plant lifetimes since 2000 which ranges from 
32 to 48 years (see Table 1 and Methods). We conduct a sensitivity analysis of avoided emissions 
on the assumed power plant lifetime of both the standard77,78 and widest range25 in the literature 
(Supplementary Figure 4 and Supplementary Table 3). We also compare the results of this 
sensitivity to calculations on committed emissions with different coal power plant lifetimes 
(Supplementary Table 3). 
We also conduct a sensitivity analysis of estimated of avoided emissions to the assumptions 
about power plant efficiencies and load factors (2). For the reference estimate, we use nationally-
calibrated load factors and technology-specific power plant efficiencies (Methods). We vary both 
power plant efficiencies and load factors by +/-10% to cover any potential change in these 
parameters. Our estimate of variance of power plant efficiency is based on analysis of US EPA 
data for capacities and output of different power plants79 with which we determined that the 
mean efficiency is 32% with a standard deviation of 2.4% and a full range of 24-41%. For load 
factors, scenarios for future developments vary from no change80 to an initial increase of some 
10% through 2035 followed by a decrease through until 205081, thus we also varied load factors 
by +/-10%. 
Finally, for the reduction in 2030 coal-fired generation (3), we test how varying the assumed 
lifetimes affects coal-fired generation in 2030 (Figure 1). For the minimum estimate, we use a 20-
year lifetime and for our maximum estimate, we use a 60-year lifetime. 
Supplementary Text 2. Selecting explanatory variables for PPCA membership 
We used a systematic approach for identifying variables that could potentially explain PPCA 
membership and predict future expansion of the Alliance. We looked for variables that would:  
- be linked to specific mechanisms plausibly supporting or blocking a political decision to 
phase-out coal;  
- could be consistently measured for the 68 countries in our sample (i.e. PPCA and other 
countries using non-trivial amounts of coal for electricity production);  
- would not duplicate other variables used in our analysis including our dependent variable 
(membership in PPCA). 
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Committing to phase-out the use of coal in electricity generation is a political decision by a 
nation state. Political decisions concerning energy use are influenced by state goals, domestic 
special (non-state) interests, and international policy diffusion. How these diverse inputs into the 
policy process are combined depends on motivations, capacities and interactions of the state and 
other relevant actors82–84.  
Motivations for energy policies can arise from state energy goals which include first and 
foremost the need to maintain a secure supply-demand balance85. How coal phase-out affects 
this goal depends on the share of coal in electricity supply, whether coal is domestically-
produced or imported and whether and how fast electricity demand is increasing. The availability 
of domestic coal reserves and other electricity generation technologies may also affect this goal. 
Other state goals relevant to the energy sector may include climate change mitigation, air 
pollution reduction, and economic development. 
In addition to state energy goals, domestic policies are shaped by vested interests, including 
those opposing coal phase-out policies because they may be particularly hurt by lost 
employment, stranded assets and slowed economic development in coal producing regions86. 
The resistance of the coal sector to phasing-out coal support policies like coal subsidies or 
preferential purchasing agreement schemes for coal power has been documented in the UK87, 
Germany88–91, and South Africa92. There may also be domestic interests supportive of coal phase-
out through citizens or organizations concerned by air pollution or climate change or even 
specifically targeting coal (through organizations like Beyond Coal33 and Coal Swarm17). 
Additionally, there can be economic interests potentially competing with coal like new 
renewables. However, these are usually more diffuse interests which tend to be less influential in 
policy change processes93. 
International policy diffusion would involve imitation, harmonization with, learning from or 
coercion by other states or international organizations. Apart from the PPCA itself, the 
European Union’s Council of Ministers has recently reached a deal to end coal subsidies94, the 
European Parliament recently passed a resolution calling Member States to phase-out coal as an 
energy source by 203095 and there are also a number of decarbonization targets which indirectly 
support coal phase-out and thus may facilitate diffusion of coal phase-out policies, especially 
given very strong political and economic ties between EU members.  
Finally, capacities of the state can be sub-divided into economic and institutional96. By 
economic capacities we mean the ability of the society to pay the costs of coal phase-out (e.g. 
compensation to plant owners and support to regions dependent on mining, compensation and 
retraining of the work-force, mobilizing investments for electricity supply infrastructure that 
would replace coal, etc.). Wealthier countries have been shown to lead development of new 
energy technologies82 and promote stricter environmental policies. An example of why economic 
capacity is important is a recent estimate of large costs of adjustment measures recommended by 
the German “Coal exit” commission97 or similar costs in Spain58 which we cite in the text.  
“Institutional capacity” (sometimes also referred to as “political capacity”) is the capacity of a 
country’s institutions to implement specific policies. It was first introduced in Ikenberry’s 
seminal study of the differences in national responses to the 1970s-1980s oil crises96. Political 
capacity has generic elements of the ability to formulate and implement any policies (e.g. the 
human and financial resources of government agencies), that is closely correlated (but not 
identical) to GDP per capita. For example, relatively rich energy exporting countries (sometimes 
called ‘petro-states’) are widely viewed as having lower political capacities. In a more specific 
sense, institutional capacity enables integrating and balancing different domestic interests and 
international influences. Governments of stable democratic countries with low levels of 
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corruption are better able to formulate and see through decisions serving state interests and to 
take into account state goals and disperse political interests (e.g. citizens concerns with air 
pollution or climate change) rather that concentrated vested interests (e.g. of coal sector). 
Based on these premises we have identified the following variables and associated hypotheses, 
which can potentially explain coal phase-out (see Methods in the main text for data sources and 
exact definition of each variable): 
1. Higher share of coal in electricity generation is expected to decrease the likelihood 
of PPCA membership through increasing the costs of coal phase-out (deploying other 
energy sources and technologies to substitute lost coal capacity and potentially 
compensating stranded coal assets) and also increasing political resistance from coal-
centered socio-technical regimes (e.g. plant workers and owners). 
2. Higher production of coal per capita is expected to decrease the likelihood of PPCA 
membership since it increases the strength of socio-technical regimes centered on coal 
and most likely resisting its phase-out. It also increases the costs of coal power phase-out 
in the form of stranded assets and potential compensation to affected communities.  
3. Higher share of coal in non-transport final energy consumption (i.e. in buildings, 
heating, and industry) is expected to decrease the likelihood of PPCA membership for 
the same reason as coal production: because it is associated with the strength of coal-
centered socio-technical regimes.  
4. Higher import dependence of coal supply is expected to increase the likelihood of 
PPCA membership. Phasing out imported coal is easier because it won’t risk energy 
security and it would not face resistance from domestic coal extraction industry. 
5. Higher electricity demand growth is expected to decrease the likelihood of PPCA 
membership because countries would need not only to substitute lost coal power 
capacity but also deploy additional capacities to address the extra electricity demand. 
6. Higher age of power plants is expected to increase the likelihood of PPCA 
membership. Retiring older power plants would lead to a smaller amount of stranded 
assets and thus less resistance to coal phase-out.  
7. Higher use of non-hydro renewable electricity technologies is expected to increase 
the likelihood of PPCA membership. Deployment of new renewables such as solar and 
wind signals both political commitment to decarbonisation and political and socio-
technical capacity for energy transition and would therefore be associated with higher 
probability of coal phase-out. 
8. Higher levels of air pollution are expected to increase the likelihood of PPCA 
membership through increased pressures on the government from affected citizens and 
communities.  
9. Higher GDP per capita is expected to increase the likelihood of PPCA membership 
since wealthier societies would be less sensitive to potential increase in electricity prices if 
coal is substituted by more expensive sources and because richer states would have more 
resources to compensate potential losers of prematurely closed coal power plants. 
10. More transparent and independent governance is expected to increase the likelihood 
of PPCA membership. We use the Functioning of Government (FoG) index to express 
this characteristic. FoG is a combined measure of (1) the absence of undue influence on 
elected government, (2) government transparency, and (3) checks against political 
corruption98. The importance of the government policies in supporting the persistence of 
the coal sector has been highlighted in the UK87, Germany88–91, and South Africa92. 
Governments free from corruption are potentially more capable on following through 
state goals, taking into account (typically dispersed) public concerns about air pollution 
and climate change and resisting (typically concentrated) lobbying pressures of pro-coal 
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interests. They are also more likely to conceive and implement effective phase-out 
policies e.g. by effectively compensating the losers of coal phase-out. 
11. EU membership is expected to increase the likelihood of PPCA membership. EU 
member countries subscribe to EU-wide policies to limit the use of coal, for example the 
recent deal on ending coal subsidies94 and the call by the European Parliament to end 
coal power by 203095  as well as to more general decarbonisation targets and to learn 
from other EU members (e.g. the UK and Germany) which have been pursuing 
controlled reduction of coal use. 
Naturally, the complex mechanisms that can lead to a decision to phase-out coal could also be 
explained by other variables. However, many such variables cannot be used for systematic and 
rigorous comparison across countries. Some key variables which we have considered but not 
analyzed include: 
National coal reserves. Although this variable can signal availability of coal, costs of extractions 
and transportation significantly vary across countries and thus coal may be less available even for 
countries with large (but expensive to extract and/or remote) resources. Russia and Ukraine are 
examples of such countries. Coal use and coal production per capita are better proxies of the 
attractiveness of producing domestic coal. 
Availability of substitutes for coal power. Although this variable could signal how easy it is to 
replace coal with other sources, there are significant problems with consistently measuring and 
comparing it across countries. First, coal can be replaced by a variety of sources including oil, 
natural gas (either domestic or imported), nuclear power, and renewables (including hydro 
power, solar, wind, biomass etc.) as well as electricity demand reduction. In case of PPCA, 
replacing unabated coal with CCS-equipped plants is also explicitly mentioned. Various countries 
have different potentials and capacities of using different sources technologies and it may be 
difficult to compare, say, a country with large shale gas reserves with a country that has capacity 
to build nuclear power plants or large energy saving potential. Secondly the ‘availability’ of all 
these technologies and sources is also difficult to measure in a consistent manner: some may 
depend on geographic features of countries while others – on their technological and economic 
capacities. However, the aggregate measure of all these various resources and technologies is the 
use of non-coal sources in the electricity mix, which is inverse to the existing variable of the 
share of coal. In other words, countries that have smaller shares of coal presumably have larger 
availability of non-coal sources and vice-versa. 
We consulted the Global CCS Institute’s Global Status of CCS Report 201599 to compare the 
prospects of CCS deployment in PPCA and non-PPCA countries at the time immediately 
preceding the formation of the Alliance. The data in the report do not indicate any systematic 
differences in either CCS-related policies, geographic conditions for CCS deployment or actual 
CCS projects between PPCA and non-PPCA members. This industry group identifies the UK 
and Canada (PPCA members) as well as Australia, US, Japan and China (non-PPCA members) 
as potential leaders of CCS deployment in terms of potential, policies and projects. Moreover, 
PPCA members include several countries with low interest in CCS and no active projects like 
Sweden, France, and Italy.  
Civil society activism. It is difficult to consistently compare the strength and effectiveness of 
civil society activism (that is often anti-coal but may also be in defense of pro-coal interests) 
across different political cultures. However, by measuring the Functioning of Government index 
we approximate the level of democracy in a country (i.e. how acceptable is civil activism) and the 
receptiveness of governments to citizens voices and concerns. 
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Coal subsidies and other government policies. This variable could signal government 
commitment to the coal sector, but it will also introduce a circularity in the analysis. Phasing-out 
coal subsidies is often a crucial part of coal phase-out and PPCA membership, while their 
persistence is a clear sign that no phase-out is planned. In other words, this is a result of a clear 
phase-out policy not an explanation in our study. 
Supplementary Text 3. Regression analysis results and additional tests 
Within the regression analysis we first produced 2036 models with 11 independent variables (see 
Methods and Supplementary Text 2). All of the models that include air pollution (PM2.5 
concentration) as a significant variable feature paradoxical results, in which this variable has an 
unexpected negative effect on PPCA membership (Supplementary Table 10). This effect does not 
reflect any of the presumed causal mechanisms although it can be speculated that low air 
pollution may be an indicator of stronger air pollution control and other environmental policies, 
(typically found in wealthy well governed countries), which may eventually support coal phase-
out. Since effective statistical models should not include variables not linked to meaningful 
causal mechanisms, we excluded the air pollution variable from further analysis.  
For the remaining 10 variables, we once again produced 1013 machine-generated models and 
identified the 10 and 20 best-fit models based on their AIC. The variables which found 
significant (at least at 10% level) in all of these models include: 
1. FoG (significant in 10 out of 10 best models and 18 out of 20 best models); 
2. GDP per capita (significant in 7 out of 10 best models and 12 out of 20 best models); 
3. Coal production per capita (significant in 5 out of 10 best models and 8 out of 20 best 
models); 
4. Coal share in electricity production (significant in 3 out of 10 best models and 8 out 
of 20 best models); 
5. Coal share in non-transport final energy consumption (significant in 1 of the 10 and 
20 best models). 
All these five variables are also present in our best-fit model (Model 1.3 in Supplementary Table 
7, Supplementary Table 8 and Supplementary Table 9) with Functioning of Government, GDP 
per capita and Coal production per capita being significant variables. In other words, we show 
that these five variables found in the best-fit model consistently show up as significant in a 
limited subset of best-fit models, which is not the case for other tested variables. 
Among these five variables, Functioning of Government reflects political factors, GDP per 
capita reflects economic factors and the remaining three variables reflect closely intertwined 
techno-economic factors characterizing the production and use of coal. Due to the limited 
number of data-points, we were not able to disentangle the effect of individual coal-related 
variables. However, we were able to demonstrate their collectively significance (and hence the 
role of the coal sector) with certainty. We tested the collective significance of these three 
variables using the likelihood ratio test100 which compares a full model that includes these 
variables and a reduced model with these variables omitted. The test indicates that these 
characteristics of the coal sector are collectively significant at the 0.15% level. Even two of these 
variables: coal production per capita and coal share in electricity production are still collectively 
significant at the 5% level.  
The presence and significance of the five variables in the best-fit models stands in stark contrast 
to the remaining 5 variables which we use in regression analysis.  
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6. Average age of coal power plants appears as significant first in the model ranked 82 by 
AIC and is present but not significant in the model ranked 5 by AIC; 
7. Share of non-hydro renewables appears as significant first in the model ranked 186 by 
AIC and is present but not significant in the model ranked 12 by AIC; 
8. Change in electricity demand in 2006-2016 appears as significant first in the model 
ranked 251 by AIC and is present but not significant in the model ranked 14 by AIC; 
9. EU membership appears as significant first in the model ranked 258 by AIC and is 
present but not significant in the model ranked 13 by AIC; 
10. Coal independence appears as significant first in the model ranked 274 by AIC and is 
present but not significant in the model ranked 4 by AIC. 
Based on this analysis we concluded that the first five variables provide better explanation of 
PPCA membership than the last five. Naturally, our statistical analysis explores correlations and 
not causations and although we aimed to identify plausible causal mechanisms, our results 
should be validated and elaborated by other methods (e.g. case-studies) to improve their 
robustness.  
Supplementary Text 4. Proposed coal phase-out in Germany 
In January 2019, the German Commission for growth, structural change and employment 
(“Wachstum, Strukturwandel und Beschäftigung”, here: the Commission) published its final 
report outlining a compromise on the phase-out of coal-fired power plants in Germany6. The 
members of the Commission which included representatives of the coal industry, workers, policy 
makers, environmental advocacy groups, representatives of regions with coal industries, and 
scientists agreed on phasing out coal-fired power generation by 2038.  
The Commission recommended that by 2022, the net capacity of coal-fired power plants is 
reduced from the current 47 GWe to 15 GWe lignite and 15 GWe hard coal capacity. By 2030, 
this should be further reduced to 9 GWe lignite and 8 GWe hard coal capacity. The “open 
clause” of the report provides the possibility for an acceleration of the final phase-out to 2035 or 
for re-evaluating its feasibility in 2032. Thus, the coal power phase-out timeline in Germany 
includes the following elements6: 
• 30. June 2020. Develop a plan for the retirement of lignite power plants in agreement 
with the power plant owners. If the plan is not reached by this date the government 
should enforce a plan by law. The agreement should contain financial compensation and 
social acceptability. 
• 2022. Reduce the generation capacity to 15 GWe lignite and 15 GWe hard coal 
through retirement or retrofitting (increased CHP) and switching the grid backup 
capacity (ca 2.3 GW) from coal to natural gas. 
• 2023. Evaluation of measures realized so far  
• 2025. Intermediate step: reduce annual emissions by 10 MtCO2 through an “innovation 
project” 
• 2026. Evaluation of measures realized so far  
• 2029. Evaluation of measures realized so far 
• 2030. Reduce the generation capacity to 9 GWe lignite and 8 GWe hard coal 
through retirement  
• 2032. “Öffnungsklausel” (open clause): evaluate whether coal phase-out can be realized 
already in 2035 and whether the phase-out is realistic in general.  
• 2035 (earliest) – end of 2038 (latest). Complete phase-out. 
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This plan stipulates the bulk of the premature retirement to occur in either 2035 or 2038 (see 
Supplementary Figure 7). 
The plan is generally acknowledged to be technologically and economically feasible101. However, 
the cost of the plan is uncertain. Financial support for regional development and structural 
change in affected areas in line with the Commission’s recommendations is estimated to amount 
to 40 billion €97. In its scale, this aid is comparable with the structural aid provided to Eastern 
Germany following Germany’s unification in the 1990s97. While there are already concrete 
proposals on the timeline and the recipients of these funds102, there are also uncertainties of how 
much of these will be additional to the already existing programs103,104. Further compensations to 
stabilize electricity prices for private consumers and the industry and support for workers are 
also envisioned105–107. 
Additionally, the Commission recommended that the government achieves a compromise with 
the owners of prematurely retired power plants. This most likely will involve compensations 
determined through negotiations6. The utility RWE has demanded compensation of 1.2-1.5 bln € 
for each prematurely retired GWe and the shares of the company have risen in expectations of 
this compensation108,109. Some are criticizing this as an expensive political gesture since many 
coal-fired plants are relatively old and would likely be decommissioned soon in any case101. The 
legal obligation of the Government to pay compensations for foregone profits has also been 
questioned110. Compensation is also a critical aspect in negotiations with Uniper, regarding the 
question whether its new power plant Datteln 4, currently under construction, will be connected 
to the grid. This hard coal power plant with a net capacity of 1.1 GWe was planned to be 
connected in 2011 but protests from environmental advocacy groups as well as technical issues 
led to a delay of the project. The current planned start date is 2020111,112.  
The report does not explicitly specify how coal-fired power generation will be substituted. While 
Germany keeps increasing its renewable electricity capacity and takes measures to reduce 
electricity demand, it is also expanding its capacities to generate power from natural gas.  
Germany is likely to build two liquified natural gas terminals in the foreseeable future113,114. 
Additionally, the Nord Stream 2 pipeline is to be completed in November 2019115.  
Age of retirement 
The average age of retirement of coal power plants in Germany in 2000-2017 is 41 years. For our 
calculations, we assume that the plans will be retired according to the ‘truncated normal 
distribution’ procedure described in the main text Methods and illustrated in Supplementary 
Figure 8. This ensures that units which are already older than the recent average lifetime are not 
retired en-masse at the starting point of the projection. We calculate capacities separately for 
lignite and hard coal power plants.  
We determine the necessary reductions from these baseline capacities to reach the targets 
proposed by the Commission (15 GWe lignite and 15 GWe for hard coal each in 2022 and 8 
GW hard coal and 9 GW lignite in 2030 as well as zero in 2038 or in 2035 for both fuels). We 
then retire plants until the target is reached, starting from the oldest operating plants and also 
plants with unspecified type of coal (in 2022 only). This means that:  
• in 2022, 18.4 GWe of coal power capacity with the weighted average unit age of 46 years 
and the minimum age of 37 years would be retired; 
• in 2030, 9.1 GWe of coal power capacity with the weighted average unit age of 41 years 
and the minimum age of 35 years would be retired; 
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• in 2038, 16.9 GW of coal power capacity with the weighted average unit age of 30 years 
and the minimum age of 22 years would be retired; if this retirement is accelerated to 
2035, the weighted average age will be reduced to 27 years and the minimum – to 19 
years. 
Avoided emissions 
To calculate avoided coal-fired power generation and CO2 emissions of this proposal, we follow 
the same method as for the PPCA members (see Methods) taking into account the retirement 
timeline outlined above. To estimate the upper boundary of avoided emissions, we conduct 
sensitivity analysis with the final phase-out in 2035 and Datteln 4 never entering operation (but 
its emissions counted as avoided). The avoided emissions under these assumptions would be 
1609 MtCO2. If phase-out is completed by 2038 and Datteln 4 operates between 2020 and 2038, 
the avoided emissions would be 1301 MtCO2. If in addition, all of the avoided generation are 
substituted by natural gas, the avoided emissions would be 644 MtCO2. 
References 
1. IEA. World energy balances. IEA World Energy Statistics and Balances (database). (2018). 
2. Platts. World Electric Power Plants Data Base. (2017). 
3. Cleveland, W., Grosse, E. & Shyu, W. Local regression models. in Statistical Models (eds. Chambers, J. & 
Hastie, T.) (Wadsworth & Brooks/Cole, 1992). 
4. Rummel, R. J. Applied Factor Analysis. (Northwestern University Press, 1988). 
5. Wei, T. & Simko, V. R package ‘corrplot’: Visualization of a correlation matrix (Version 0.84). (2017). 
6. German Ministry of Economy and Energy. Commission ‘Growth, Structural Change and Employment’ (Kommission 
‘Wachstum, Strukturwandel und Beschäftigung’). (2019). 
7. Boden, T., Marland, G. & Andres, R. Global, Regional, and National Fossil-Fuel CO2 Emissions. (2017). 
doi:10.3334/CDIAC/00001_V2017 
8. UNFCCC. National Inventory Submissions. (2017). Available at: https://unfccc.int/process/transparency-
and-reporting/reporting-and-review-under-the-convention/greenhouse-gas-inventories/submissions-of-
annual-greenhouse-gas-inventories-for-2017/submissions-of-annual-ghg-inventories-2014. (Accessed: 1st 
June 2018) 
9. US EPA. State CO2 emissions from fossil fuel combustion. (2018). 
10. Government of Canada. Coal phase-out: the Powering Past Coal Alliance. (2018). Available at: 
https://www.canada.ca/en/services/environment/weather/climatechange/canada-international-
action/coal-phase-out.html. (Accessed: 18th April 2018) 
11. Government of Alberta. Phasing out coal pollution. Climate Leadership Plan (2018). 
12. Beyond Coal. Overview: National coal phase-out announcements in Europe. (2018). 
13. Industry Briefing. Europe energy Europe coal phase outs gather pace. Economist Intelligence Unit (2017). 
14. Beetz, B. Spain’s Balearic Islands proposes ambitious 100% renewable energy law. PV Magazine (2018). 
15. Chen, H. Korean Province to phase out coal: implications for Asia. National Resource Defense Council (2018). 
Available at: https://www.nrdc.org/experts/han-chen/korean-province-phase-out-coal-implications-asia. 
(Accessed: 5th December 2018) 
16. Scottish Government. Scottish Government joins clean power group. Scottish Government (2018). Available 
at: https://www.gov.scot/news/powering-past-coal-alliance/. (Accessed: 13th March 2019) 
17. EndCoal. Global Coal Plant Tracker. Coal Swarm (2018). Available at: https://endcoal.org/tracker/. 
(Accessed: 20th April 2018) 
18. KallanishEnergy. New York moves to end coal- fi red power plants by. Kallanish Energy (2018). 
19. Henry, D. NY gov aims to phase out coal by. The Hill (2018). 
20. Opalka, B. New England’s last coal-fired power plants face uncertain futures. Energy News (2018). 
21. Yerton, S. Oahu’s cheapest source of power is about to go away. Honolulu Civil Beat (2017). 
22. Paulos, B. Washington State leaves coal behind, but not its workers. energytransition.org (2018). 
23. 78th Oregon Legislative Assembly. No Title. (2016). 
24. Orr, I. Minnesota plans to retire 1,829 MW of coal and replace it with 7,200 MW of wind, solar, and gas. 
American Experiment (2018). 
25. Davis, S. J. & Socolow, R. H. Commitment accounting of CO2 emissions. Environ Res Lett 9, (2014). 
26. Government of Australia. Australia’s Intended Nationally Determined Contribution to a new Climate Change 
Agreement. (2015). 
 26 
27. Government of Australia. Australia’s 7th National Communication on Climate Change: A Report Under the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. (2017). 
28. Jotzo, F., Mazouz, S. & Wiseman, J. Coal Transitions in Australia. Preparing for the looming domestic coal phase-out 
and falling export demand. (2018). 
29. Krapp, P. Australian government backs coal in defiance of IPCC climate warning. The Guardian (2018). 
30. Department of Climate Change and National Development & Reform Commision of China. China’s First 
INDC Submission. UNFCCC (2015). 
31. Xu, M. & Stanway, D. China to cut coal use, curb steel in 2018-2020 pollution plan | Reuters. Reuters 
(2018). 
32. Shearer, C., Yu, A. & Nace, T. Tsunami Warning: Can China’s central authorities stop a massive surge in new coal 
plants caused by provincial overpermitting? (2018). 
33. Europe Beyond Coal. Overview: National coal phase-out announcements in Europe, Coal phase-out status November 
2018. (2018). 
34. Czech Republic National Climate and Energy Plan. (2019). 
35. India’s Intended Nationally Determined Contribution: Working Towards Climate Justice. (2016). 
doi:10.1017/CBO9781107415324.004 
36. Central Electricity Authority. National Electricity Plan. (2018). 
37. First Nationally Determined Contribution Republic of Indonesia. (2016). 
38. Spencer, T. et al. Climate Policy The 1.5°C target and coal sector transition: at the limits of societal feasibility 
The 1.5°C target and coal sector transition: at the limits of societal feasibility. (2017). 
doi:10.1080/14693062.2017.1386540org/10.1080/14693062.2017.1386540 
39. Government of Japan. Submission of Japan’s Intended Nationally Determined Contribution (INDC). (2015). 
40. Government of Japan. Japan’s Seventh National Communication Under the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change. (2017). 
41. Government of Japan Ministry of Economy Trade and Industry. Strategic Energy Plan. (2018). 
42. Normile, D. Bucking global trends, Japan again embraces coal power. Science (80- ) 360, 476–477 (2018). 
43. Republic of Kazakhstan. Intended Nationally Determined Contribution: Submission of the Republic of Kazakhstan. 
(2015). 
44. Ministry of Energy of the Republic of Kazakhstan, United Nations Development Programme in 
Kazakhstan & Global Environment Facility. Seventh National Communication and third Biennial report of the 
Republic of Kazakhstan to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change. (2017). 
45. Republic of Korea. Submission by the Republic of Korea Intended Nationally Determined Contribution. (2015). 
46. Korean Ministry of Trade Industry and Energy. Ministry announces 8th Basic Plan for Electricity Supply 
and Demand. (2017). Available at: 
http://english.motie.go.kr/en/tp/energy/bbs/bbsView.do?bbs_seq_n=605&bbs_cd_n=2&view_type_v=
TOPIC&&currentPage=1&search_key_n=&search_val_v=&cate_n=3. (Accessed: 13th November 2018) 
47. The Government of Malaysia. Intended Nationally Determined Contribution of the Government of Malaysia. (2015). 
doi:10.1007/s13398-014-0173-7.2 
48. Ministry of Energy Science Technology Environment and Climate Change. Malaysia Third National 
Communication and Second Biennial Update Report To the UNFCCC. (2018). doi:ISBN 978-967-13297-4-0 
49. Ministerstwo Energii. National Energy and Climate Plan for the years 2021-2030: Objectives and targets, and policies 
and measures. (2019). 
50. Government of the Russian Federation. The Russian Federation’s Intended Nationally Determined 
Contribution. 3 (2015). 
51. Government of the Russian Federation. Seventh National Communication of the Russian Federation submitted in 
accordance with Articles 4 and 12 of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and Article 7 of the 
Kyoto Protocol. (2017). 
52. The Government of the Russian Federation. Energy Strategy of Russia for the period to 2035. (2017). 
53. The Government of the Russian Federation. Master Plan for Siting Electricity Facilities up to 2035: Decree 1209. 
(2017). 
54. South Africa ’s Intended Nationally Determined Contribution (INDC). (2015). 
doi:10.1002/0471238961.0601141913151418.a01 
55. Department of Environmental Affairs Republic of South Africa. South Africa’s Third National Communication 
under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. (2018). 
56. Department of Energy Republic of South Africa. Integrated Resource Plan 2018 Final Draft for Public 
Input. (2018). 
57. Ministry of Ecological Transition for the Government of Spain. Draft of the integrated national energy and climate 
plan 2021-2030. (2018). 
58. Neslen, A. Spain to close most coalmines in € 250m transition deal. 3, (2018). 
59. Republic of Turkey. Republic of Turkey Intended Nationally Determined Contribution. (2015). 
60. Republic of Turkey Ministry of Environment and Urbanization, Global Environment Facility & Program, 
U. N. D. Seventh National Communication of Turkey under the UNFCCC. (2018). 
 27 
61. The Government of Ukraine. Ukraine first nationally determined contribution. (2016). 
62. The Government of Ukraine. National plan for reduction of emissions from large combustion facilities. Approved by the 
Cabinent of Ministers on 08.11.2017, No 796-p. (2017). 
63. EIA. Annual Energy Outlook 2019 with projections to 2050. (2019). 
64. Greenblatt, J. B. & Wei, M. Assessment of the climate commitments and additional mitigation policies of 
the United States. Nat Clim Chang 6, 1090–1093 (2016). 
65. US Department of State. Second Biennial Report of the United States of America under the United Nations Convention 
on Climate Change. (2016). 
66. Environmental Protection Agency. EPA Proposes Affordable Clean Energy (ACE) Rule. (2018). 
67. Vietnam Prime Minister. Intended Nationally Determined Contribution of Viet Nam. (2015). 
doi:10.2214/ajr.172.4.10587147 
68. Socialist Republic of Viet Nam. The third national communication of Viet Nam to the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change. (2019). 
69. MOIT Vietnam & Embassy of Denmark. Vietnam energy outlook report. (2017). 
70. Nhu, V. Plans on developing power, coal sectors adjusted. The socialist republic of Vietnam, Online Newspaper of 
the Government (2016). 
71. Katzer, J. et al. The Future of Coal: An interdisciplinary MIT study. (Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2007). 
72. Hardisty, P. E. et al. Life Cycle Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Electricity Generation: A Comparative 
Analysis of Australian Energy Sources. Energies 5, 872–897 (2012). 
73. US Energy Information Administration. Carbon Dioxide Emission Coefficients. Environment (2016). 
Available at: https://www.eia.gov/environment/emissions/co2_vol_mass.php. (Accessed: 16th January 
2018) 
74. Johnson, N. et al. Stranded on a low-carbon planet: Implications of climate policy for the phase-out of coal-
based power plants. Technol Forecast Soc Change 90, 89–102 (2015). 
75. Steckel, J. C., Edenhofer, O. & Jakob, M. Drivers for the renaissance of coal. Proc Natl Acad Sci 112, E3775–
E3781 (2015). 
76. Davis, S. J. & Socolow, R. H. Commitment accounting of CO<inf>2</inf> emissions. Environ Res Lett 9, 
(2014). 
77. Edenhofer, O., Steckel, J. C., Jakob, M. & Bertram, C. Reports of coal’s terminal decline may be 
exaggerated. Environ Res Lett 13, 24019 (2018). 
78. Johnson, N. et al. Stranded on a low-carbon planet: Implications of climate policy for the phase-out of coal-
based power plants. Technol Forecast Soc Change 90, 89–102 (2015). 
79. US Environmental Protection Agency. 2018 coal unit characteristics. (2019). 
80. International Energy Agency. World Energy Outlook 2018. (2018). 
81. European Commission. EU Reference Scenario 2016 - Energy, transport and GHG emissions - Trends to 2050. 
Energy, transport and GHG emissions - Trends to 2050 (European Union, 2016). doi:10.2833/9127 
82. Jewell, J. Ready for nuclear energy?: An assessment of capacities and motivations for launching new national 
nuclear power programs. Energy Policy 39, (2011). 
83. Cherp, A., Vinichenko, V., Jewell, J., Brutschin, E. & Sovacool, B. Integrating techno-economic, socio-
technical and political perspectives on national energy transitions: A meta-theoretical framework. Energy Res 
Soc Sci 37, (2018). 
84. Cherp, A., Vinichenko, V., Jewell, J., Suzuki, M. & Antal, M. Comparing electricity transitions: A historical 
analysis of nuclear, wind and solar power in Germany and Japan. Energy Policy 101, (2017). 
85. Helm, D. Energy policy: Security of supply, sustainability and competition. Energy Policy 30, 173–184 (2002). 
86. Spencer, T. et al. The 1.5°C target and coal sector transition: at the limits of societal feasibility. Clim Policy 18, 
335–351 (2018). 
87. Turnheim, B. & Geels, F. W. Regime destabilisation as the flipside of energy transitions: Lessons from the 
history of the British coal industry (1913-1997). Energy Policy 50, 35–49 (2012). 
88. Frondel, M., Kambeck, R. & Schmidt, C. M. Hard coal subsidies: A never-ending story? Energy Policy 35, 
3807–3814 (2007). 
89. Pahle, M. Germany’s dash for coal: Exploring drivers and factors. Energy Policy 38, 3431–3442 (2010). 
90. Storchmann, K. The rise and fall of German hard coal subsidies. Energy Policy 33, 1469–1492 (2005). 
91. Jungjohann, A. & Morris, C. The German coal conundrum. (2014). 
92. Baker, L., Newell, P. & Phillips, J. The Political Economy of Energy Transitions: The Case of South Africa. 
New Polit Econ 19, 791–818 (2014). 
93. Olson, M. The logic of collective action: public goods and the theory of groups. (Harvard University Press, 1971). 
94. Simon, F. EU forges deal on coal phase-out, with special Polish clause. Euractiv (2018). Available at: 
https://www.euractiv.com/section/electricity/news/eu-hammers-deal-on-coal-phase-out-with-special-
polish-clause/. (Accessed: 18th March 2019) 
95. European Parliament. A Europe that protects: Clean air for all. (2019). 
96. Ikenberry, G. J. The irony of state strength: Comparative responses to the oil shocks in the 1970s. Int Organ 
40, 105–137 (1986). 
 28 
97. Schultz, S. Germany should phase-out coal by 2038 at the latest (Deutschland soll bis spätestens 2038 aus 
der Kohle aussteigen). Spiegel Online (2019). 
98. Freedom House. Freedom in the world 2018: Methodology. (2018). 
99. Global CCS Institute. The global status of CCS 2015: Summary Report. (2015). 
100. Kleinbaum, D. & Klein, M. Logistic regression: A self-learning text. (Springer US, 2010). 
101. SpiegelOnline. Union politicians warn against ‘expensive iconology’. Spiegel Online (2019). 
102. Stratmann, K. & Witsch, K. Almaier wants to help the coal regions with 40 billion euros of aid through 
2038 (Altmaier will den Kohleländern mit 40 Milliarden Euro bis 2038 helfen). Handelsblatt (2019). 
103. SpiegelOnline. Government plans to decide measures for structural change by the end of May (Regierung 
will bis Mai Maßnahmen für Strukturwandel beschließen). Spiegel Online (2019). 
104. Schultz, S. What will the agreement of the Coal Exit bring (Was die Einigung zum Kohleausstieg bringt). 
Spiegel Online (2019). 
105. Zeit Online. Many billions for Coal Exit (Viele Milliarden für den Kohleausstieg). Zeit Online (2019). 
106. Cembalest, M. Eye on the market: Annual Energy Paper. (2019). 
107. Wehrmann, B. RWE substantiates claims for billion-euro coal plant compensation. Clean Energy Wire (2019). 
108. Steitz, C. & Käckenhoff, T. Germany’s RWE to keep struggling coal-fired plants as exit nears. Reuters 
(2019). 
109. Wacket, M. RWE shares up on hopes for higher coal exit compensation. Reuters (2019). 
110. Bauchmüller, M. & Müller, B. The government is not yet negotiating with energy companies (Regierung 
verhandelt noch nicht mit Energiekonzernen). Süddeutsche Zeitung (2019). 
111. Steitz, C. & Käckenhoff, T. Germany’s coal exit could mean cash windfall for plant operators. Reuters 
(2019). 
112. Uniper SE. Datteln 4. (2018). Available at: https://www.uniper.energy/de/datteln-4. (Accessed: 25th March 
2019) 
113. Cohen, A. Germany’s first LNG terminal is the right move for Europe’s energy security. Forbes (2018). 
114. Reuters. Update 1 - Germany set to have at least 2 LNG terminals - minister. Reuters (2019). 
115. Johnson, I. Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline to open by November. Deutsche Welle (2019). 
 
